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VoLTUME XXIX MAY, 1955 NuMBER 2
THE MONETARY MINIMUM IN FEDERAL COURT
JURISDICTION: II*
WERNER ILSEN
WILLIAM SARDE LL t
ACTIONS INVOLVING INS URANCE POLICIES
T HIS subject involves various types of insurance policies
and the claims thereunder. In New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Viglas,' one Viglas held a policy issued by the insur-
ance company for $2,000 payable on his death. The policy
also entitled him to monthly benefit payments and suspension
of premiums if totally and permanently disabled. While he
was in the enjoyment of these rights, upon the assumption
that such disability existed, he was notified by the insurance
company that it would no longer make the payments or waive
premiums, because it appeared to the company that for some
time past he had not been continuously totally disabled with-
in the terms of the policy. Upon Viglas' failure to pay a pre-
mium on the next due date, the company noted on its records
* This is the second and concluding article by Professor Ilsen and Mr.
Sardell on this subject. The first article appeared in the December 1954 issue
of the ST. JOHN's LAW REVmW.
t Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
* Member of the New York and Federal Bars.
2297 U.S. 672 (1936). See Kuhn v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 37 F.
Supp. 102 (S.D. N.Y. 1941).
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that the policy had lapsed, Viglas, however, being entitled
to certain limited benefits. Viglas then brought suit for
damages in the amount of $15,900 on the theory that the acts
of the insurance company constituted an anticipatory breach
of the contract of insurance. The sum claimed was the total
benefits that would be available during his life expectancy
under the American Table of Mortality. The Supreme Court
held that under the circumstances the doctrine of anticipa-
tory breach was not applicable, and that the real controversy
was only over the amount of disability benefits due at the
institution of the suit, which was less than $100. The Court
said: "For breach short of repudiation or an intentional
abandonment equivalent thereto, the damages under such a
policy as this do not exceed the benefits in default at the
commencement of the suit." 2
Two years prior to this holding, the Supreme Court
had a quasi insurance case before it for decision. That
was Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v.
Pinkston 3 which arose on a bill in equity brought to protect
the entire contract giving to plaintiff a monthly pension for
the remainder of her life. The protection sought was not
merely for herself but for others similarly situated, and in-
volved the entire fund being administered by the Brother-
hood, which fund, it was claimed by plaintiff, was being
administered to destroy the value of the entire contract. In
the trial court, an actuary was allowed to testify that
the value of plaintiff's right to receive $35 a month so long
as she remained unmarried was $6,000. The entire fund in
the pension department was nearly $300,000. The Supreme
Court held: "This, it will be seen, is not an action at law to
recover overdue instalments, but a suit in equity to preserve
and protect a right to future participation in the fund. If
the value of that right exceeds $3,000, the district court has
jurisdiction." 4
2 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, supra note 1 at 678; cf. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. v. Kortz, 151 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1945); Columbian Nat. Life Ins.
Co. v. Goldberg, 138 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 765 (1944);
Trainor v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 131 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1942).
3293 U.S. 96 (1934).
4 Id. at 99-100. See Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S. 551 (1913) ; Calhoun
v. Lange, 40 F. Supp. 264 (D. Md. 1941), 9 U. oF CHi. L. REv. 339 (1942).
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Assume an insured claims against the insurance com-
pany on a policy providing for installment payments where
permanent disability under the contract of insurance is
asserted by the insured and denied by the insurer. The in-
sured brings suit in a federal court for the installments al-
ready accrued (which installments do not total the jurisdic-
tional minimum) claiming that the court, in determining the
amount in controversy, may consider the payments due in
the future if liability under the contract is established-
amounts which would be in excess of $3,000, exclusive of
interest and costs. Or, similarly, assume the case where the
action is brought in a state court and the insurance company
makes the same assertion in its petition for the removal of
the action from the state court to the federal court. This
problem has frequently confronted the federal courts. In
Button v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.,5 a case originally filed in a
state court and removed by the defendant, the federal court,
on granting the plaintiff's motion to remand, held:
The matter in controversy involves only the liability of the insurance
company to make the payments already accrued [in this case, less
than the jurisdictional minimum]. No controversy exists in this ac-
tion as to any disability payments under the contract in the future.
The insurance company may or may not decline to pay them, and
facts occurring subsequent to the filing of this action may completely
justify its refusal to make future monthly payments even though the
result of this action obligates it to pay those already accrued; such
subsequently occurring facts might lead the insurance company to
make such payments in the future irrespective of the result of this
action. This action is in no way res judicata as to its liability under
the policy in the future. Although the effect of the judgment in this
case may result in the insured collecting from the insurance company
a total sum far in excess of the jurisdictional amount, yet it is well
settled that when federal jurisdiction depends upon the amount in
controversy, "it is determined by the amount involved in the particu-
lar case, and not by any contingent loss either one of the parties may
sustain by the probative effect of the judgment, however certain it
may be that such loss will occur." New England Mortgage Security
5 48 F. Supp. 168 (W.D. Ky. 1943), 41 MicH. L. REv. 1203, 92 U. oF PA.
L. REv. 211.
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Co. v. Gay, 145 U.S. 123, 12 S. Ct. 815, 816, 36 L. Ed. 646. The
collateral effect of a judgment is not the test of jurisdiction.6
It has also been held that where an insured brought suit
in a state court to recover accrued disability benefits amount-
ing to $581 under insurance policies totalling $8,000 in
amount, defendant insurance company could not remove the
case to a federal court on the ground of the diversity of citi-
zenship of the parties and for the reason that, in the event of
plaintiff's recovery of judgment, defendant would be required
by law to set up a reserve against future disability payments
of over P,000J There is some authority that the reserve
required should be taken into account.8
Where, however, the insured brought suit in a state court
not only to recover the disability benefits, amounting to $600
under a policy of life insurance in the sum of $10,000, but
also to have the policy declared in full force and effect, upon
an allegation that the defendant had wrongfully declared it
lapsed for nonpayment of premiums and had converted it
into a policy of extended term insurance under the option
features of the contract, the case was properly removed to the
federal court since the relief sought to reinstate the policy
"... .would directly determine the validity of a policy in-
volving $10,000 life indemnity in addition to disability
benefits. ... ,, 9 The court, therefore, held that ". . . it is
perfectly clear that it [the action] involves more than $3,000,
6 Button v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., sapra note 5 at 171. The court, at this
point, cited the following decisions in support of its final statement: Bruce v.
Manchester & Keene R.R., 117 U.S. 514 (1886); Opelika City v. Daniel, 109
U.S. 108 (1883) ; New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Trotter, 108 U.S. 564 (1883) ; Elgin
v. Marshall, 106 U.S. 578 (1882); Troy v. Evans, 97 U.S. 1 (1877). See
Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1934); Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Wilson,
81 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1936); Wright v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 19 F.2d 117
(5th Cir. 1927), aff'd mer., 276 U.S. 602 (1928); Gates v. Union Central Life
Ins. Co., 56 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. N.Y. 1944).
7 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Moyle, 116 F.2d 434 (4th Cir. 1940); Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Temple, 56 F. Supp. 737 (W.D. La. 1944); Gates v. Union
Central Life Ins. Co., supra note 6; Asbury v. New York Life Ins. Co., 45
F. Supp. 513 (E.D. Ky. 1942); Mitchell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 31 F. Supp.
441 (W.D. La. 1940).
8 See Struble v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 20 F. Supp. 779 (S.D.
Fla. 1937); Ross v. Travelers Ins. Co., 18 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. S.C. 1936);
Enzor v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 14 F. Supp. 677 (E.D. S.C. 1936).
But see Huey v. Prudential Ins. Co., 23 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ala. 1938).
9 Bell v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 78 F.2d 322, 323 (4th Cir. 1935).
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exclusive of interest and costs." 'o In an action by the in-
sured for judgment declaring a policy of insurance contain-
ing a double indemnity provision to be in full force and
granting insured a recovery of $50 per month under the dis-
ability provision of the policy for a period commencing with
a specified date, the insurer denied any liability with respect
to the double indemnity and disability provisions and con-
tended that, as to the ordinary life provisions, the policy had
lapsed. The lower court had dismissed the action for want
of jurisdiction on the theory that the unpaid disability in-
stallments totalled less than $3,000. The court of appeals
in reversing held: "And we think there can be no question
but that the requisite jurisdictional amount was involved in
the suit. This amount was not merely the unpaid disability
installments... but also the $5,000 double indemnity feature
of the policy which the company had declared void, and the
$5,000 ordinary life feature, which the company had declared
lapsed .... , 11 But where in a declaratory judgment action
the court was asked to hold that the insured's rights under
the policy were (1) a right to the sum, admittedly less than
$3,000, which was due and owing at the time action was com-
menced and (2) a right to the "future benefits," i.e, benefits
based on insured's life expectancy and the assumption that,
throughout his life, he would be continuously and totally dis-
abled and prevented from performing any and every duty
pertaining to his occupation, the court properly held that it
had no jurisdiction saying: "Obviously, no right to such
'future benefits' existed at the time the action was com-
menced. No one, at that time, knew or could have known
whether such a right would ever exist. Therefore, as to such
'future benefits,' there was and could have been, at that time,
no controversy." 12
10 Ibid. See Ginsburg v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 69 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.
1934); Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 27 F. Supp. 735 (E.D.
N.Y. 1939) ; Rydstrom v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 25 F. Supp. 359 (D. Md.
1938); Berlin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 18 F. Supp. 126 (D. Md. 1937).
11 Stephenson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 92 F.2d 406, 410 (4th Cir.
1937). As to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202
(1952), see Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937), 108 A.L.R.
1000; Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Kortz, 151 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1945).
12 Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Fowles, 154 F2d 884, 886 (9th Cir.
1946), 165 A.L.IR 1068; see New York Life Ins. Co. v. Greenfield, 154 F.2d
1955]
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But if the insurance company seeks an adjudication void-
ing a policy by reason of fraud, the face amount of the policy
is in controversy and if the policy is for more than $3,000,
the jurisdictional amount is present.la Where the insurer
sought an adjudication that would relieve it from both ma-
tured and future disability payments amounting to $220
per month and the insured had a life expectancy of 11.68
years, it has been held that the amount in controversy ex-
ceeded the $3,000 minimum necessary to confer jurisdiction
in a diversity case.12b
Actions involving liability or indemnity policies may also
raise questions. An insurer agreed to indemnify a physician
against loss, not exceeding $5,000, resulting from malpractice
except where damage resulted from performance of a crim-
inal act. The insurer, however, was not obligated to indem-
nify the insured until a judgment had been rendered against
him. Thereafter the physician committed an act causing his
patient's death; the insurer claimed that the act was within
the terms of the exception in the policy. For this act the
physician was sued in a state court for $10,000. The insurer,
refusing to defend the action, brought an action in a federal
court against the physician and the administrator of the
estate of the deceased patient for a judgment declaring that
the policy in question did not cover the claim asserted against
the physician. In holding that the jurisdictional minimum
existed, the court said:
It is intended to disclose that the Surety Company has no obli-
gation to defend the insured against the claim for $10,000 because he
has been guilty of criminal misconduct not covered by the policy. If
this is shown, it will be necessarily determined thereby that the Surety
Company has no obligation to indemnify him in the event of an ad-
953 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Greenfield, 154 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.
1946); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Temple, 56 F. Supp. 737 (W.D. La. 1944).
12a Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 157 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1946) ; Nev
York Life Ins. Co. v. Kaufman, 78 F.2d 398 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 296
U.S. 626 (1935). See also Morris v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 130 F.2d 553
(9th Cir. 1942) (action to reform fire insurance policy); Ballard v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 109 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1940) ; Mutual Benefit Health & Accident
Ass'n v. Fortenberry, 98 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1938).
12b Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Kortz, supra note 11.
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verse decision; and since its obligation to indemnify, if found to exist,
extends to the sum of $5,000, the amount in controversy is sufficient.1 3
In this type of insurance it has been held that, although the
amount of the insured's claim had not yet been ascertained,
the amount in controversy was the maximum liability for
which the insurer could be held legally responsible, and, if
that was in excess of $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
the district court had jurisdiction.14 Where diversity of citi-
zenship exists, it has also been held that the district court
had jurisdiction of insurer's suit against the insured and
beneficiary to cancel two life insurance policies for $2,500
and $2,000, respectively. "Neither policy was in principal
amount for more than $3,000 . . . ; but the two combined
exceed the statutory minimum. In our opinion the require-
ments of the statute are met in this case." 15
A recent Supreme Court decision 16 involved a special
pension provision under the Workmen's Compensation Law
of the State of Tennessee.17  Pursuant to this law an action
had been instituted in a Tennessee court by the employee's
widow, a citizen of Tennessee, in her behalf and in behalf of
two minor children for statutory relief alleging that the de-
13 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 99 F.2d 665, 668 (4th Cir. 1938) ;
see Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270 (1941);
American Casualty Co. v. Howard, 173 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1949); American
General Ins. Co. v. Booze, 146 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1944); Home Ins. Co. v.
Trotter, 130 F.2d 800 (8th Cir. 1942); C. E. Carnes & Co. v. Employers'
Liability Assur. Corp., 101 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1939); Lumbermens Mut. Cas-
ualty Co. v. C. Y. Thompson Co., 87 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. S.C.), aff'd, 183
F.2d 729 (4th Cir. 1950); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Woody, 47 F. Supp.
327 (D. N.J. 1942); Comment, 46 YALE L.J. 286 (1936).
14 Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 13 F. Supp. 174 (S.D. Tex.
1935) ; see Security Ins. Co. v. Jay, 109 F. Supp. 87 (D. Minn. 1952); Ohio
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Maloney, 44 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1942) ; New Century
Casualty Co. v. Chase, 39 F. Supp. 768 (S.D. W. Va. 1941). But see Hardware
Mut. Casualty Co. v. Schantz, 178 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1949) (declaratory
judgment to determine rights of parties under a public liability policy) ; United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Thomson, 32 F. Supp. 15 (S.D. Iowa 1940).
25 Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Parsons, 70 F.2d 863, 864 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 293 U.S. 582 (1934) ; see Jamerson v. Alliance Ins. Co., 87 F.2d
253 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 633 (1939) ; American Union Ins. Co. v.
Lowman Wine & B. Co., 92 F. Supp. 881 (W.D. Mo. 1950); Oshry v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 27 F. Supp. 237 (D. Mass. 1939).
16 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Flowers, 330 U.S. 464 (1947); see Note,
36 CALiF. L. Ray. 124 (1948).
'7 TENN. CoDE ANN. § 6851 et seq. (Williams, Supp. 1952).
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cedent had died as the result of an accident occurring in the
course of his employment. Burial expenses plus benefits in
the sum of $5,000, the maximum under the Tennessee statute,
were sought on behalf of the widow and her minor children.'
This action was opposed by the decedent's former employer,
a North Carolina corporation, and by Aetna Casualty, the
insurance carrier, a Connecticut corporation. On application
of the defendants, the action was removed to a federal district
court. The plaintiffs sought remand alleging, inter aria, that
the jurisdictional amount was not involved. The district
court dismissed the action on another ground. The court of
appeals held that the jurisdictional minimum was not pres-
ent, and therefore ordered the case remanded to the state
court.19 The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of an
apparent conflict with Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
& Enginemen v. Pinkston,2" as to the jurisdictional minimum
requirement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
jurisdictional minimum was present.
If this case were one where judgment could be entered only for
the installments due at the commencement of the suit .... 21 future
installments could not be considered in determining whether the juris-
dictional amount was involved, even though the judgment would be
determinative of liability for future installments as they accrued .... 22
But this is not that type of case. For the Tennessee statute which
creates liability for the award contemplates a single action for the de-
termination of claimant's right to benefits and a single judgment for
the award granted .... 23
Is Under the Tennessee statute, death benefits were provided in the sum of
60% of the average weekly wages of the employee [TENN. CODE ANN. § 6852(c)
(Williams, Supp. 1952)], but payments might not exceed $18 per week nor
continue for more than 400 weeks. TENN. CoDE ANN. §§ 6880, 6883(17) (Wil-
liams, Supp. 1952). In addition there was a ceiling of $5,000 on total benefits
exclusive of burial and certain other expenses. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6881
(Williams, Supp. 1952). See Haynes v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 178 Tenn.
648, 162 S.W.2d 383 (1942) (The complaint alleged that 601 of the average
weekly wage for the statutory period would exceed $5,000.).
29 Flowers v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 154 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1946).
20293 U.S. 96 (1934).
21 See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672 (1936).
22Wright v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 19 F2d 117 (5th Cir. 1927), aff'd mer.,
276 U.S. 602 (1928); see Button v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 48 F. Supp. 168
(W.D. Ky. 1943).
23 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6880, 6881, 6890, 6891, 6893 (Williams, Supp. 1952);




Nor does the fact that it cannot be known as a matter of absolute
certainty that the amount which may ultimately be paid, if respondent
prevails, will exceed $3,000, mean that the jurisdictional amount is
lacking. This Court has rejected such a restrictive interpretation of
the statute creating diversity jurisdiction.24 It has held that a pos-
sibility that payments will terminate before the total reaches the jur-
isdictional minimum is immaterial if the right to all the payments is
in issue .... 25 Future payments are not in any proper sense con-
tingent, although they may be decreased or cut off altogether by the
operation of conditions subsequent .. .6 And there is no suggestion
that by reason of life expectancy or law of averages the maximum
amount recoverable can be expected to fall below the jurisdictional
minimum. .... Moreover, the computation of the maximum amount
recoverable is not complicated by the necessity of determining the life
expectancy of respondent.2 7
INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS
When a contract is payable in installments, does the
value of the entire contract, when there is an alleged breach,
or only the amount already paid or past due, determine the
court's jurisdiction? Although most of the cases involving
this question are insurance cases which have been previously
considered,28 there are a few decisions in other fields.
It is almost a clichi to say that jurisdiction is measured
... by the amount directly involved in the suit and not by
any collateral effect the judgment may have." 29
Illustrative is Davis v. American Foundry Equipment
Co.3 Plaintiff had licensed defendant to manufacture and
24Query: Is there a difference as to the monetary minimum between a
federal question and a diversity of citizenship case?25 Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Pinkston, 293 U.S.
96 (1934); Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S. 551 (1913).
26 In support of this statement, the Court again cited Thompson v. Thompson,
supra note 25.
2 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Flowers, 330 U.S. 464, 467-468 (1947);
cf. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Pinkston, supra note
25; Thompson v. Thompson, supra note 25; see Milan v. Kausch, 194 F.2d 263,
265 (6th Cir. 1952); Boyd v. R. P. Farnsworth & Co., 105 F. Supp. 113 (E.D.
La. 1952) ; Capps v. New Jellico Coal Co., 87 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Tenn. 1950) ;
Godfrey v. Brown Paper Mill Co., 52 F. Supp. 926 (W.D. La. 1943); Note,
18 TutNE L. REv. 655 (1944).
28 See pp. 183-191 supra.
29 See Note, Federal Jurisdiction: Amount in Controversy in Installment
Payment Situation, 36 CA-W. L. REv. 124 (1948).
30 94 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1938). See Note, Develofnents sn the Law -
Declaratory Judgments 1941-1949, 62 HAv. L. REv. 787, 802 (1949).
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use certain patented devices for which defendant agreed to
pay $500 each year to a total of some $9,500. Some four years
after the contract was made, with $2,000 then due, plaintiff
brought suit for declaratory judgment on the ground that
defendant was asserting the contract to be void under
Indiana law. Jurisdiction was invoked on diversity and on
the claim that the validity of the entire contract which had
value in excess of $3,000 was in issue. The district court dis-
missed the action for lack of the jurisdictional minimum.
On appeal the court reversed and held that the validity of the
entire contract was in doubt so that the jurisdictional amount
was present. "This is a suit not for coercive relief for the
damages thus far accrued, but rather for declaratory relief.
True it is that plaintiff might not invoke the court's juris-
diction in a suit to recover $2,000 in money, but this suit
is for other relief; it is in the nature of a suit to quiet
title .... ,, 31
Citing the Davis case is Landers Frary & Clark v.
Vischer Products Co.3 2  This, too, was for a declaratory
judgment where the plaintiff sought to obtain a judgment on
an installment of a promissory note not yet due or, in the
alternative, appropriate equitable relief against loss of equi-
table security. As was stated by the district court:
The defendants' jurisdictional argument rests upon the theory
that the amount in controversy does not exceed $3,000 because the
note involved does not come due until July 16, 1953, and hence cannot
be in controversy at the present time. This argument cannot be sus-
tained for even if it be held that there is no controversy over the said
note, the pleadings, nevertheless, present a controversy involving the
alleged fraudulent transfer of corporate assets, the value of which ap-
pears upon the face of the complaint. The consequent damage to the
plaintiff must be measured by the unpaid balance on the note namely
$56,250 for which equitable security has been lost except for this suit.
The statutory requirement as to jurisdictional amount is satisfied
whenever any property or claim of the parties capable of pecuniary
estimation is the subject of litigation and is presented by the pleadings
31 Davis v. American Foundry Equipment Co., supra note 30 at 443.
32201 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1953). The facts are more fully given in the
decision below at 104 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Ill. 1952). See Empire Box Corp.
v. Willard Sulzberger Motor Co., 104 F. Supp. 762 (D. N.J. 1952).
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for judicial determination notwithstanding the fact that the sum is not
due or payable at the time of commencement of suit.33
CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
Section 1331 of the Judicial Code (federal question) 34
with which we are here concerned is based on Section 41(1)
of former Title 28. As we have seen, this section requires a
minimum monetary amount as a prerequisite to jurisdiction.
Does this requirement apply to civil rights cases? The ques-
tion has attracted law review commentators. 35
The difficulty arises because some of the cases dealt with
under this rubric may also be subsumed under present Sec-
tion 1343(3) of Title 28,36 which is based on Section 41(11)
of former Title 28. 37 Section 1343, entitled "Civil rights"
gives to the district courts original jurisdiction of any civil
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege
or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by
any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
In this section there is no express requirement of any
monetary minimum as a preliminary to jurisdiction.38
A Supreme Court decision which sheds light on the
jurisdictional distinction between Section 1331 (federal ques-
tion) and Section 1343(3) (civil rights) of Title 28, is
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization.39 In that
33 104 F. Supp. 411, 416 (N.D. Ill. 1952).
3428 U.S.C. § 1331 (1952).
35 See Comment, Jurisdiction over Violations of Civil Liberties by State
Governments and by Private Individuals, 39 MIcH. L. Rv. 284 (1940); Notes,
Section 24(14) of the Judicial Code-The Reappearance of a Neglected Ground
of Federal Jurisdiction, 52 HAiv. L. REv. 1136 (1939), Jurisdictional Amount
in Civil Rights Cases, 9 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 302 (1942).
36 62 STAT. 932 (1948).
3736 STAT. 1092 (1911).
38 Thus, the first paragraph of 28 U.S.C. §41(1) (1926) ended with the
sentence: "The foregoing provision as to the sum or value of the matter in
controversy shall not be construed to apply to any of the cases mentioned in
the succeeding paragraphs of this section [for example, Section 41(14)]."
39307 U.S. 496 (1939). See Note, 52 HARv. L. REv. 1136 (1939).
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case plaintiffs were individual citizens, unincorporated labor
organizations composed of such citizens and a membership
corporation. They brought suit in the United States District
Court against the Mayor, the Director of Public Safety, the
Chief of Police of Jersey City, New Jersey, and the Board of
Commissioners (the governing body of the city) alleging that
the defendants, acting under color of certain city ordinances,
had prevented plaintiffs from remaining in the city, distribut-
ing printed matter, or holding public meetings "to explain to
workingmen the purposes of the National Labor Relations
Act, the benefits to be derived from it, and the aid which the
Committee for Industrial Organization would furnish work-
ingmen to that end." The complaint charged that these
ordinances were unconstitutional and void, or were being
enforced against plaintiffs in an unconstitutional and dis-
criminatory way; that defendants, as officials of the city,
purporting to act under the ordinances, had deprived plain-
tiffs of the privileges of free speech and peaceable assembly,
secured to them, as citizens of the United States, by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The complaint
prayed for an injunction against continuance of defendants'
conduct. The complaint further alleged that the cause was
of a civil nature, arising under the Constitution and laws of
the United States, wherein the amount in controversy ex-
ceeded 3,000, exclusive of interest and costs; and was a suit
in equity to redress the deprivation, under color of state law,
statute and ordinance, of rights, privileges and immunities
secured by the Constitution of the United States, and rights
secured by the laws of the United States providing for equal
rights of citizens of the United States and of all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States.
After trial on the merits the district court entered a de-
cree based on findings of fact and conclusions of law in favor
of the plaintiffs. The court of appeals concurred in the find-
ings of fact and held that the district court had jurisdiction
under Section 24 (1) (now Section 1331) and Section 24(14)
[now Section 1343(3)] of the Judicial Code; modified the
decree in respect of one of its provisions, and, as modified,
affirmed it. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
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On the question whether there was jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court (through Justice Roberts) held:
The wrongs of which respondents [plaintiffs] complain are tor-
tious invasions of alleged civil rights by persons acting under color
of state authority. It is true that if the various plaintiffs had brought
actions at law for the redress of such wrongs the amount necessary
to jurisdiction under Section 24(1) [Section 1331] would have been
determined by the sum claimed in good faith.4o But it does not fol-
low that in a suit to restrain threatened invasions of such rights a mere
averment of the amount in controversy confers jurisdiction. In suits
brought under subsection (1) [Section 1331] a traverse of the allega-
tion as to the amount in controversy, or a motion to dismiss based
upon the absence of such amount, calls for substantial proof on the
part of the plaintiff of facts justifying the conclusion that the suit in-
volves the necessary sum.41 The record here is bare of any showing
of the value of the asserted rights to the respondents individually and
the suggestion that, in total, they have the requisite value is unavail-
ing, since the plaintiffs may not aggregate their interests in order to
attain the amount necessary to give jurisdiction. 42 We conclude that
the District Court lacked jurisdiction under Section 24(1) [Section
1331].43
As to jurisdiction under Section 1343(3) of Title 28
[then Section 24 (14)], Justice Roberts held:
The question now presented is whether freedom to disseminate
information concerning the provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act, to assemble peaceably for discussion of the Act, and of the op-
portunities and advantages offered by it, is a privilege or immunity
of a citizen of the United States secured against State abridgement 44
by § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment; and whether Rev. Stat. § 1979
and § 24(14) [Section 1343(3)] of the Judicial Code, . . . afford
40 Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902) ; Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S.
58 (1900); cf. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283(1938).41 McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936); cf.
KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269 (1936).
42 Scott v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 243 (1920); Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594
(1916); Wheless v. St. Louis, 180 U.S. 379 (1901).
43 Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, supra note 39 at 507-508.
44As to what constitutes state action within the meaning of the amendment,
see Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103 (1935); Home T. & T. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913);
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879) ; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
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redress in a federal court for such abridgement. ... The bill, the an-
swer and the findings fully present the question. The bill alleges,
and the findings sustain the allegation, that the respondents had no
other purpose than to inform citizens of Jersey City by speech, and
by the written word, respecting matters growing out of national legis-
lation, the constitutionality of which this court has sustained.
Although it has been held that the Fourteenth Amendment cre-
ated no rights in citizens of the United States, but merely secured
existing rights against state abridgement, 45 it is clear that the right
peaceably to assemble and to discuss these topics, and to communicate
respecting them, whether orally or in writing, is a privilege inherent
in citizenship of the United States which the Amendment protects.
Citizenship of the United States would be little better than a
name if it did not carry with it the right to discuss national legislation
and the benefits, advantages, and opportunities to accrue to citizens
therefrom. . . .The District Court had jurisdiction under § 24(14)
[Section 1343 (3) ].46
The Court concluded that "[n]atural persons, and they alone,
are entitled to the privileges and immunities which § 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment secures for 'citizens of the United
States.' 17 Only the individual respondents may, therefore,
maintain this suit." 48
Justice Stone, although not doubting that the ultimate
judgment was correct, felt ". . .unable to follow the path
by which some of my [his] brethren have attained that
end . . ." 49 and thereupon stated his thoughts in some detail.
"The question remains whether there was jurisdiction in the
district court to entertain the suit although the matter in
controversy cannot be shown to exceed $3,000 in value be-
45 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) ; Ex parte Virginia, supra note 44;
Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162 (U.S. 1874); Slaughter-House Cases, 16
Wall. 36 (U.S. 1872).
46 Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 512-513(1939).
47 See Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U.S. 112 (1912); Western Turf
Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907); Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U.S.
68 (1900) ; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557 (1899).
48 Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, sutnpa note 46 at 514;
see Mickey v. Kansas City, 43 F. Supp. 739 (W.D. Mo. 1942).




cause the asserted rights, freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly, are of such a nature as not to be susceptible of
valuation in money." 50 The Justice, after surveying the his-
tory of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and the Federal Question
Act of March 3, 1875, 51 held that
. . .since 1875, the jurisdictional acts have contained two parallel
provisions, one conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts, district
or circuit, to entertain suits "arising under the Constitution or laws
of the United States" in which the amount in controversy exceeds a
specified value; the other, now § 24(14) [Section 1343(3)] of the
Judicial Code, conferring jurisdiction on those courts of suits author-
ized by the Civil Rights Act of 1871, regardless of the amount in
controversy. 52
Justice Stone then observed that all such suits are ac-
tions arising under a statute of the United States to redress
deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities secured by
the Constitution, and, therefore, are
• . . literally suits "arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States." But it does not follow that in every such suit the
plaintiff is required by § 24(1) [Section 1331] of the Judicial Code
to allege and prove that the constitutional immunity which he seeks
to vindicate has a value in excess of $3,000. There are many rights
and immunities secured by the Constitution, of which freedom of
speech and assembly are conspicuous examples, which are not capable
of money valuation, and in many instances, like the present, no suit
in equity could be maintained for their protection if proof of the juris-
dictional amount were prerequisite. We can hardly suppose that
Congress, having in the broad terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
vested in all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States a
right of action in equity for the deprivation of constitutional im-
munities, cognizable only in the federal courts, intended by the Act
of 1875 to destroy those rights of action by withholding from the
courts of the United States jurisdiction to entertain them.
* Since the two provisions stand and must be read together, it is
obvious that neither is to be interpreted as abolishing the other, espe-
cially when it is remembered that the 1911 amendment of § 24(1)
5oId. at 527.
1 18 STAT. 470 (1875).
52 Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 529 (1939)
(concurring opinion).
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provided that the requirement of a jurisdictional amount should not be
construed to apply to cases mentioned in § 24(14) [Section 1343(3)].
This must be taken as legislative recognition that there are suits au-
thorized by § 1 of the Act of 1871 which could be brought under
§ 24(14) [Section 1343(3)] after, as well as before, the amendment
of 1875 without compliance with any requirement of jurisdictional
amount, and that these at least must be deemed to include suits in
which the subject matter is one incapable of valuation. Otherwise
we should be forced to reach the absurd conclusion that § 24(14)
[Section 1343(3)] is meaningless and that a large proportion of the
suits authorized by the Civil Rights Act cannot be maintained in any
court, although jurisdiction of them, with no requirement of juris-
dictional amount, was carefully preserved by § 24(14) [Section
1343(3)] of the Judicial Code and by the 1911 amendment of
§ 24(1).53
Justice Stone next pointed out that the jurisdiction con-
ferred by Section 24(14) [Section 1343 (3) ] is only preserved
to the extent limited, i.e., to suits alleging deprivation of
"civil rights." Thus, where the suit was brought to restrain
alleged unconstitutional taxation of patent rights, i.e., a prop-
erty right, the action was one arising under the Constitution
or laws of the United States within the meaning of Section
24(1) [Section 1331] of the Judicial Code and that the
United States Circuit Court [now district court] was with-
out jurisdiction because the challenged tax was less than the
jurisdictional amount.54
The conclusion seems inescapable that the right conferred by the
Act of 1871 to maintain a suit in equity in the federal courts to pro-
tect the suitor against a deprivation of rights or immunities secured
by the Constitution, has been preserved, and that whenever the right
or immunity is one of personal liberty, not dependent for its existence
upon the infringement of property rights, there is jurisdiction in the
District Court under § 24 (14) [Section 1343 (3) ] of the Judicial Code
to entertain it without proof that the amount in controversy exceeds
$3,000. As the right is secured to . . . "any person" as well as ...
[to] a citizen, it is certain that resort to the privileges and immunities
clause would not support the decree which we now sustain and would
53Id. at 529-530.
541Id. at 530-531. Mr. Justice Stone cited Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176
U.S. 68 (1900). Cf. Crane v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 339 (1917); Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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involve constitutional experimentation as gratuitous as it is unwar-
ranted. We cannot be sure that its consequences would not be
unfortunate.55
To the opinion of Justice Stone there should be added
the obvious fact that Section 1343(3) only applies to an ac-
tion to redress the deprivation, under color of any state law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the
United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States. 6
As has been indicated, the monetary minimum has been
treated somewhat diversely in this situation.5 7  In a recent
case in the Fifth Circuit, the court apparently without any
hesitation reversed itself as to whether the action brought
was bottomed on Section 1331 or on Section 1343 (3) of Title
28. Originally the court had before it an appeal from a judg-
ment, dismissing the complaint of the plaintiffs, who sought
to enjoin the enforcement of certain ordinances of the City
of Atlanta, Georgia. The challenged portions of these ordi-
nances provided that no person could operate a taxi, bus or
similar vehicle in Atlanta, without having first obtained a
permit to do so from specified Atlanta authorities. The lower
court had dismissed the action on the merits because the ordi-
nances presented a valid exercise of the police power of the
state. On appeal, the court found that it did not appear
from the complaint that the amount in controversy exceeded
3,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and sua sponte, raised
the question of federal jurisdiction. Assuming that juris-
55 Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, sapra note 52 at 531-532
(concurring opinion) ; see City of Manchester v. Leiby, 117 F.2d 661 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 562 (1941) ; Barnette v. West Va. State Board of Edu-
cation, 47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D. W. Va. 1942), af'd, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) ; Note,
The Proper Scope of Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1285, 1289-1291
(1953) ; cf. Carroll v. Somervell, 116 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1941) ; Cooney v. Legg,
34 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. Cal. 1940).
56 See Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, mpra note 52 at
525-526 (concurring opinion); see McGuire v. Amrein, 101 F. Supp. 414
(D. Md. 1951).
57 See, e.g., City of Manchester v. Leiby, supra note 55; Carroll v. Somervell,
supra note 55; Barnette v. West Va. State Board of Education, supra note 55;
Cooney v. Legg, supra note 55.
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diction was based on Section 1331 of Title 28 (the federal
question section), requiring a showing that the amount in
controversy exceeded the jurisdictional minimum, the court
modified the judgment so as to dismiss the complaint for want
of jurisdiction, and not on the merits.58
The plaintiffs then applied for a rehearing based solely
on the ground that they were bringing their suit under Sec-
tion 1343(3) which, as we have seen, does not require a
monetary minimum as a prerequisite to jurisdiction. With-
out discussing the question, the court said: "Construing the
complaint as required by Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure " . . .we accept the . . .interpretation thereof,
and uphold federal jurisdiction under Section 1343(3)....
Therefore, the petition for rehearing is granted and the judg-
ment heretofore entered herein is set aside. This leaves
the case pending before us and ready for decision on its
merits .... , 60
CASES INVOLVING COUNTERCLAIMS
Circuit Judge Dobie's plaintiff-viewpoint approach has
raised questions where the plaintiff, in an action commenced
in a federal court, has alleged in his complaint an amount
in controversy less than the jurisdictional amount and the
defendant, possibly desirous of remaining in the federal
court, has asserted a counterclaim in excess of $3,000, exclu-
sive of interest and costs, or a counterclaim which, added to
plaintiff's claim, exceeded that amount. Under those cir-
cumstances, has the federal court jurisdiction of the action?
This problem was concretely presented by Judge Dobie many
years ago and persuasively answered in the negative, al-
though admitting that this was "its severest test." 61 The
58 Walton v. City of Atlanta, 180 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1950).
59 "They [these Rules] shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. Civ. P. 1. Cf. Form 2,
concerning allegation of jurisdiction, annexed to the Rules.
60 Walton v. City of Atlanta, 181 F.2d 693 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
823 (1950). The court thereupon affirmed the lower court on the merits. See
Cobb v. City of Malden, 202 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1953); Burt v. City of New
York, 156 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1946).
61 See Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount in the United States District Court,
38 HAav. L. REv. 733 (1925).
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Supreme Court has not flatly determined the question, al-
though it has on occasion made remarks which have been
interpreted by some lower courts as holding that the amount
of the counterclaim may be added to the amount of the plain-
tiff's claim to make up the needed jurisdictional minimum.
Indeed, some lower courts have answered the question in the
affirmative. Thus, in Roberts Mining & Milling Co. v.
Schrader,62 plaintiff alleged that diversity of citizenship was
present but did not state the value of the controversy,
"... nor did it allege or state any fact from which it might
be inferred that the matter in controversy exceeded, exclu-
sive of interest and costs, the sum or value of 3,000. In
other words, the bill failed to state a cause of action within
the jurisdiction of the District Court." 63 The defendant took
no advantage of this jurisdictional defect, and filed an answer
containing a counterclaim seeking substantially the same re-
lief as did the complaint, and which alleged diversity of citi-
zenship and that the matter in controversy exceeded the sum
of $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs. No reply was filed
to the counterclaim. The court held that this counterclaim
brought the case within the jurisdiction of the federal court,
regardless of the lack of the jurisdictional amount appearing
in the complaint, saying: "Consequently, from and after
the filing of the counterclaim, the District Court had juris-
diction of this case." 64 Another decision which seems to
have reached the same conclusion is Ginsburg v. Pacific
Mutual Life Ins. Co.6" There plaintiff had brought suit in a
federal court to recover damages for alleged breach of an
executory accident insurance policy, the plaintiff basing his
damages of over $25,000 on his expectancy of life. The actual
amount due at the time of suit was $750. Defendant's answer
contained a counterclaim seeking judgment setting aside the
policy on the ground that plaintiff had misrepresented the
condition of his health and that the policy by its terms had
8295 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1938).
631d. at 523.
64 Id. at 524. The court relied on the following decisions for its conclusions:
Home Life Ins. Co. v. Sipp, 11 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1926); American Sheet & Tin
Plate Co. v. Winzeler, 227 Fed. 321 (N.D. Ohio 1915); Clarkson v. Manson,
4 Fed. 257 (C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1880).
65 69 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1934).
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no valid legal inception. The lower court had dismissed the
action on the theory that the jurisdictional amount was not
involved.6 6 The court of appeals, in reversing held:
We need not consider the jurisdictional controversy as to the
amount the appellant sues to recover because the counterclaim inter-
posed establishes the jurisdiction of the District Court. Merchants'
Heat & Light Co. v. James B. Clow & Sons, 204 U.S. 286, 27 S. Ct.
285, 51 L. Ed. 488; 0. J. Lewis Mercantile Co. v. Klepner, 176 F.
343 (C.C.A.2), certiorari denied 216 U.S. 620, 30 S. Ct. 575, 54
L. Ed. 641. It seeks a repudiation and cancellation of a policy of
insurance which involves a valuation of more than $3,000.6 7
There are several Supreme Court decisions which have
been asserted as tending to support the proposition that the
counterclaim may be considered in determining whether the
jurisdictional amount is present. An analysis of these cases
will show that this assertion is unwarranted. First there is
66 5 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. N.Y. 1933).
67 Ginsburg v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra note 65 at 98. This decision
was clarified by the same court in Goldstone v. Payne, 94 F.2d 855 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 304 U.S. 585 (1938). Discussing the Ginsburg case, the Second
Circuit said: "That was an appeal from a dismissal on the ground that the
complaint disclosed that the controversy involved less than the jurisdictional
amount. In a per curiam opinion we said that it was unnecessary to consider
the jurisdictional controversy as to the amount sued for by the plaintiff because
the counterclaim established the jurisdiction of the district court. The only
authorities cited were Merchants Co. v. Clow & Sons [204 U.S. 286 (1907)]
and the Klepner Case [176 Fed. 343 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 216 U.S. 620(1910)]. The statement would appear to be a dictum, for the opinion had
previously stated that the complaint set forth three causes of action, one of
which claimed damages of more than $25,000." Id. at 857. [But see the dis-
cussion of the insurance cases at pp. 183-191 supra.] The Merchants case was
explained as follows: "In that case it was held that by pleading in recoupment
the defendant waived any defect in the service of process upon it. This de-
cision is plainly inapplicable to the facts at bar. Where a court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of an action, a defendant may submit himself to the
court and thereby confer upon it jurisdiction over his person. But, where the
court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, the defect is not
cured by getting personal jurisdiction of the defendant. Such a want of juris-
diction cannot be waived by pleading or any other form of consent-not even
by going to trial." Ibid. The court further observed: ". . . 0. J. Lewis
Mercantile Co. v. Klepner . . . cites Merchants Co. v. Clow & Sons . . . for
the following statement: 'Again, the defendant interposed a counterclaim and,
having invoked the jurisdiction of the court for its own benefit, is now estopped
from denying it.' If this be construed as meaning that a defendant by filing a
counterclaim can give a court jurisdiction of a case over which a statute denies
it jurisdiction, the statement is certainly not supported by the authority cited and
must be deemed erroneous, as Judge Wooley demonstrated in Home Ins. Co.
v. Sipp, 3 Cir., 11 F.2d 474, at page 476." Ibid.
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the case of Kirby v. American Soda Fountain Co., 6 8 a re-
moved action. The action, when brought in the state court,
was one to recover $1,500 as damages for deceit. Subse-
quently, plaintiff amended his petition in the state court, set-
ting forth a claim in excess of the jurisdictional minimum.
Defendant, thereupon, removed the case to the federal court.
In that court defendant asserted a cross complaint for $1,700
and for other relief. Plaintiff then obtained an order dis-
missing his bill of complaint without prejudice. Some time
later, ". . .plaintiff, as defendant in the cross complaint,
filed his plea thereto, in which he averred that the original
bill filed by him had been dismissed, and that the cross bill
was not within the jurisdiction of the court because the
amount sought to be recovered did not exceed two thousand
dollars, exclusive of interest and costs [then the jurisdic-
tional minimum]." 69 The plea to the jurisdiction was over-
ruled and plaintiff was ordered to file an answer. This he
failed to do and a default judgment for $1,700, with interest
and for other relief, was entered. On appeal, the Supreme
Court held that the lower court was right in rejecting the con-
tention that it had no jurisdiction to proceed on the cross bill
because it was below the jurisdictional minimum, saying:
"... it is the general rule that when the jurisdiction of a
Circuit Court of the United States [now district court] has
once attached it will not be ousted by subsequent change in
the conditions." 70 In other words, before plaintiff obtained
an order dismissing his complaint, the federal court had
jurisdiction of the cause since that complaint demanded
damages in excess of the jurisdictional minimum, and
.... jurisdiction thus acquired by the Circuit Court was not
divested by plaintiff's subsequent action." 71 Certainly there
can be no quarrel with this holding and it is for this propo-
sition that this case is chiefly cited. 72
08 194 U.S. 141 (1904).
6O Id. at 143.
70 Id. at 145-146.
71 Id. at 146.
72 See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283,
293 (1938); Grant County Deposit Bank v. McCampbell, 194 F.2d 469, 472
(6th Cir. 1952); Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Duling, 190 F.2d 797,
802 (6th Cir. 1951); Haney v. Wilcheck, 38 F. Supp. 345, 349-350 (W.D. Va.
1941).
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The Supreme Court, however, in the course of the opin-
ion, made these vague and unnecessary remarks: "In the
first place, the whole record being considered, the value of
the matter in dispute might well have been held to exceed
two thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs ...
Taking the bill, defendant's answer and the cross bill to-
gether, the jurisdictional amount was made out." 73 In sup-
port of this observation the Supreme Court cited several
cases which involved the then monetary requirement with
respect to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 4
It should be noted that the amount in controversy in pro-
ceedings before appellate courts was somewhat different from
the amount in controversy in courts of original jurisdiction
and that in the former case a counterclaim might properly
be considered in determining whether the required amount
in controversy -was present.7 5
The next Supreme Court decision which requires some
consideration is Mackay v. Uinta Development 0o.78 This
also was a case originally commenced in a state court. The
plaintiff Uinta had sued to recover damages in the sum of
$1,950 and the defendant, while still in the state court had
set up a counterclaim for $3,000 after the expiration of the
time in which he was required to plead. Under the state
statute the defendant, if he had brought a separate action
on the claim set forth in the counterclaim, would not have
been entitled to costs if successful. Without objection on the
part of Uinta, the defendant removed the case to a federal
court on the theory that the parties were citizens of different
states; that the construction of certain federal statutes raised
in defendant's answer was necessarily involved, and that the
amount in dispute, as disclosed by the counterclaim, exceeded
$2,000, the then jurisdictional minimum. Both parties ap-
73Kirby v. American Soda Fountain Co., 194 U.S. 141, 144-145 (1904).
7' See Shappirio v. Goldberg, 192 U.S. 232 (1904); New England Mortgage
Security Co. v. Gay, 145 U.S. 123 (1892); Lovell v. Cragin, 136 U.S. 130
(1890); Stinson v. Dousman, 20 How. 461 (U.S. 1858).
75 "Thus, a defendant pleading, below, a counterclaim of appellate jurisdic-
tional amount, and defeated below, is entitled (as a matter of Appellate juris-
dictional amount) to Appeal or Error (as the case may be), although the claim
of the plaintiff below was below that amount." CHAPLIN, PRINCIPLES OF THE
FaF.RAL LAW § 686 n.31 (1917). See note 74 supra.
76229 U.S. 173 (1913).
[ VOL. 29
MONETARY JURISDICTION
peared in the federal court and Uinta then filed a reply to
Mackay's counterclaim. The case was tried and judgment
was entered in favor of Uinta. Mackay appealed but neither
party raised any question as to the power of the court to de-
termine the cause. In this posture, the court of appeals
sua sponte certified to the Supreme Court various questions
as to whether Mackay could remove the case to the federal
court, among them the following which alone was considered
by the Supreme Court:
"Assuming that the removal at the instance of Mackay was not
in conformity with the removal statute, and assuming that as respects
his claim against the Development Company all the jurisdictional ele-
ments were present which were essential to enable the Circuit Court
to take cognizance thereof, if he had commenced an action thereon
in that court, and assuming that in such an action the Development
Company lawfully could have set up its claim as a counter-claim and
thereby have enabled the court to take cognizance thereof, Did the
parties by appearing in the Circuit Court and there litigating both
claims to a final conclusion in a single cause, without any objection
to the jurisdiction of the court or to the manner in which its juris-
diction was invoked, enable that court to take cognizance of the con-
troversy and to proceed to a final judgment therein with like effect as
if they had invoked the jurisdiction of that court in the first instance
through an action commenced therein by Mackay upon his claim and
through the interposition by the Development Company of its claim
as a counter-claim in that action?" TT
It would seem that the court of appeals, in certifying
this question to the Supreme Court, altered in substance the
factual situation in the case. In this question, the defendant
Mackay in the state court action, who had asserted a coun-
terclaim in excess of the jurisdictional minimum, was made
the plaintiff in an assumed action in a federal court, and the
real plaintiff Uinta was made the defendant in that assumed
federal court action although the actual facts were that Uinta
had brought an action in a state court on a claim insufficient
in amount to authorize removal to a federal court. On the
basis of this supposititious case, the Supreme Court had
really no alternative but to answer this question in the af-
7 7Id. at 175.
1955 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
firmative, which it did, holding, however, that the federal
court had obtained jurisdiction by waiver of the parties.
The Court was careful to state that, because of its answering
that question in the affirmative, it was "... unnecessary to
consider the status of the parties in the state court and who
was technical plaintiff and who technical defendant, or
whether Mackay, a non-resident defendant, sued in a state
court for $1,950, could, by filing a counter-claim for $3,000,
acquire the right to remove the case to the United States
court." 78 But the Court made some other observations
which are rather difficult to reconcile with that statement.
Thus, the very next sentence in the opinion reads as follows:
"The case was removed in fact, and, while the parties could
not give jurisdiction by consent, there was the requisite
amount and the diversity of citizenship necessary to give the
United States Circuit Court jurisdiction of the cause. The
case. therefore, resolves itself into an inquiry as to whether,
if irregularly removed, it could be lawfully tried and
determined." 79 In its obvious desire to aid both parties in
their joint endeavor to uphold the jurisdiction of the trial
court which had determined the case on the merits, the
Supreme Court concluded by saying:
As the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter the parties could
have been realigned by making Mackay plaintiff and the Development
Company defendant, if that had been found proper. 80 But if there
was any irregularity in docketing the case or in the order of the
pleadings such an irregularity was waivable and neither it nor the
method of getting the parties before the court operated to deprive it
of the power to determine the cause. 81
78 Id. at 175-176.
79 Id. at 176.8oThis statement must be considered in conjunction with the holding in
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941), where the Court
held that a plaintiff defending against a counterclaim was not a defendant
within the removal statute and could not remove. See 29 CALIF. L. REv. 769
(1941); 27 VA. L. RaV. 1094 (1941).
8' Mackay. v. Uinta Development Co., 229 U.S. 173, 176-177 (1913). The
Uinta case was cited in Arizona & New Mexico Ry. v. Clark, 235 U.S. 669,
674 (1915), for the proposition that: "The removal proceedings were in the
nature of process to bring the parties before that court [i.e. federal court], and
the voluntary appearance of the parties there was equivalent to a waiver of any
formal defects in such proceedings." See Scroggin Farms Corp. v. McFadden,
165 F.2d 10 (8th Cir. 1948); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Burden,
53 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1931).
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Surely this case, although disturbing, does not solve the
question.
Another case to be considered is Yankaus v. Felten-
stein . 2 There the Supreme Court went off on the point that
an order of a United States District Court in remanding a
case to a state court could not, under the provisions of Title
28 of the Judicial Code, be reviewed on writ of error to a
subsequent judgment of the state court. The holding of
Judge Hough, quoted in the Supreme Court decision, re-
manding the case, but not passed upon by the Supreme Court,
deserves quotation. It is in part as follows:
"Since no case (irrespective of amount involved) can be removed
over which the United States Court might not have had original
jurisdiction, it has always seemed to me illogical to consider a coun-
terclaim in ascertaining the propriety of removal or remand.
"In the State of New York there is no compulsion on a defen-
dant to set up a counterclaim. It is always optional with the party
possessing it to reserve his affirmative demand for an independent
suit.
"Imagine this action brought originally in this Court; the defen-
dant would only have been obliged to appear and move on the plead-
ings to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. Such a motion
would have been granted as of course.
"Thus it appears that an action of the most trifling nature may
(under defendant's contention) be removed to this Court at the op-
tion of defendant if he can assert a counterclaim of sufficient size.
That this was never the intent of the statute I am clear. Considering,
however, the confusion of decisions and (so far as I kno'v) the failure
of late years to observe the difference between the Act of 1875
[18 STAT. 470] and that of 1888 [25 STAT. 433],83 I should have
felt impelled to consider and classify decisions were it not for the
consideration next to be stated. If it be true that by a preponderance
82244 U.S. 127 (1917).
8 3 The Act of 1875 provided that either plaintiff or defendant had the right
to remove the suit. The Act of 1888 confines the right of removal to a non-
resident defendant. Furthermore, the Act of 1875 permitted removal ".... before
or at the term at which said cause could be first tried and before the trial
thereof for the removal of such suit into the circuit court... ." 18 STAT. 471.
The Act of 1888 limited removal to ". . . the time, or any time before the
defendant is required by the laws of the State or the rule of the State court
in which such suit is brought to answer or plead... ." 25 STAT. 435.
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of rulings the affirmative claims set up in an answer are to be con-
sidered in determining jurisdiction, it is at least necessary that some-
where and in some shape the defendant who sets up counterclaims
shall plead them in a manner which enables his opponent to criticize
them, modify them or expunge them as may be proper under the rules
of good pleading.
"In this case,-and in any similar case under the Act of 1888
there is no answer. The only knowledge that to this moment plaintiff
has regarding defendant's counterclaim is contained in the petition for
removal,-the language of which petition sets forth no reason what-
ever for the recovery by the defendant from the plaintiff of any sum
of money at all. The petition says in substance that the defendant
has a counterclaim, without stating what it is. Whatever may be the
preferred rule, when in a proper and formal manner the amount in
controversy between the parties is made to appear and shown to ex-
ceed $3,000 exclusive of interest and costs ;-I feel justified in hold-
ing, and do hold, that it is impossible to show that such controversial
amount exists in any such manner as this defendant has attempted." 8 4
A possible solution of this problem with respect to ac-
tions originating in a federal court may be found in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Two types of counter-
claims are provided for by these Rules, namely, a compulsory
counterclaim and a permissive counterclaim. What is the
difference between these counterclaims? A compulsory coun-
terclaim is defined as follows: ". . . any claim which at the
time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any
opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occur-
rence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim .... 8 5 Such a counterclaim must be pleaded unless
its adjudication requires the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, except that such
a claim need not be so stated if at the time the action was
commenced the claim was the subject of another pending
action. A permissive counterclaim is described as: ".... any
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the trans-
action or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim." 86 A simple example of a compulsory coun-
84 Yankaus v. Feltenstein, supra note 82 at 131-133.
85 FaD. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
86Fm. R. Civ. P. 13(b) (emphasis added).
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terclaim would be a case where A sues B for the price of
goods sold and delivered and B counterclaims for breach of
warranty. An example of a permissive counterclaim is an
action where A sues B for breach of contract X, and B coun-
terclaims for breach of contract Y.
Rule 13 includes both legal as well as equitable counter-
claims, but, in substance, it embodies former Equity Rule
30.817 If a defendant suffers an action to proceed to judgment
without interposing a compulsory counterclaim, the claim is
barred.8 8 It should not be overlooked that the cases raising
the question of the jurisdictional amount were actions where
the counterclaims (which were considered in order to de-
termine whether the requisite jurisdictional amount was
present) were claims which arose out of the transaction
which was the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim.
So, a plausible argument could be made that if the coun-
terclaim in the federal action is a compulsory one, the federal
court, at the option of the defendant, may assume jurisdic-
tion in an action where the plaintiff's claim is less than the
jurisdictional minimum as soon as defendant interposes his
answer containing a counterclaim which, when added to the
plaintiff's claim or by itself, exceeds $3,000, exclusive of in-
terest and costs, although no case has been turned up which
actually supports this proposition.89 In such a case the
"matter in controversy" may be said not to be merely the
amount which the plaintiff claims, but also that which the
87 "The answer must state in short and simple form any counterclaim arising
out of the transaction which is the subject of the suit, and may ... set up any
set-off or counterclaim against the plaintiff which might be the subject of an
independent suit in equity against him. . . " Equity Rule 30, 268 U.S. 709, 710
(1925) (emphasis added).
88 This was the rule under old Equity Rule 30. See General Electric Co.
v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U.S. 430 (1932) ; Moore v. New York Cotton
Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926); American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., 260
U.S. 360 (1922). It now applies both to legal and equitable counterclaims of
the compulsory type. See Home Ins. Co. v. Trotter, 130 F.2d 800 (8th Cir.
1942); Hancock Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 115 F2d 45 (9th Cir.
1940); Thierfeld v. Postman's Fifth Avenue Corp., 37 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.
N.Y. 1941); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Little Rock Basket Co., 14 F.R.D. 381
(E.D. Ark. 1953).
89 Cf. Home Life Ins. Co. v. Sipp, 11 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1926) ; Lange v.
Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 99 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Iowa 1951); see Comment,
Federal Jurisdiction in Cases Involving Counterclaims, 45 YALE L.J. 1479
(1936).
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defendant, if he desires to litigate the issues in that court,
must under necessity assert if he is to resist the plaintiff's
demand and enforce his own. Under those circumstances,
a federal court should not sua sponte divest itself of juris-
diction by dismissing plaintiff's complaint because it failed
to allege the jurisdictional minimum where defendant's coun-
terclaim was jurisdictionally sufficient. If plaintiff's action
should, however, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the
defendant, as plaintiff, could then commence an action in the
same federal court, based on the facts previously set out in
his counterclaim, against the former plaintiff, who would
then as defendant assert the claim, dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, as a compulsory counterclaim. Of course, this
presupposes that the plaintiff is within the reach of process
of that federal court. It might very well be otherwise, in
which event the original defendant would be forced to pro-
ceed to another federal court, probably away from his home,
to assert his claim.
Where, however, a permissive counterclaim is interposed
in an action originating in a federal court, a different situa-
tion is presented. Unlike a compulsory counterclaim, a per-
missive counterclaim, being an independent claim, requires
independent jurisdictional grounds to support itY 0 It fol-
lows, therefore, that if the original action in the federal court
is voluntarily dismissed or abandoned, by the plaintiff, such
a permissive counterclaim is not affected thereby.91 But
90 Celite Corp. v. Dicalite Co., 96 F.2d 242 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 305
U.S. 633 (1938) ; Utah Radio Products Co. v. Boudette, 78 F.2d 793 (1st Cir.
1935); United States Expansion Bolt Co. v. H. G. Kroncke Hardware Co.,
234 Fed. 868 (7th Cir. 1916) ; Hoosier Casualty Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214
(N.D. Iowa 1952); Rockwell Mfg. Co. v. Evans Enterprises, Inc., 95 F. Supp.
431 (W.D. N.Y. 1950); Niash Refining Co. v. Sydney Berman Co., 89 F. Supp.
539 (S.D. N.Y. 1950); Frankart, Inc. v. Metal Lamp Corp., 32 F.2d 920 (E.D.
N.Y. 1929); Rosenthal v. Fowler, 12 F.R.D. 388 (S.D. N.Y. 1952).
91 "On this appeal, three points are argued: (1) That the District Court,
having dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, was without power to
hear and determine the counterclaim. . . .
"As to the first, counsel insists that when the bill of complaint was dis-
missed, '. . . jurisdiction fell and the counterclaim should have been dismissed
with the bill' Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 607-609, 46 S.
Ct. 367, 70 L. Ed. 750, 45 A.L.R. 1370, and Kelleam et al. v. Maryland Casualty
Co., 312 U.S. 377, 61 S. Ct. 595, 85 L. Ed. 899 are- cited to sustain this position.
In the last named case, Justice Douglas, speaking to -the facts in that case,
said that once the bill of complaint was dismissed no jurisdiction remained for
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where a compulsory counterclaim has been interposed and
the original claim is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the
compulsory counterclaim should likewise fall unless it has
independent grounds to support it.92
In other words, the amount in controversy asserted in a
permissive counterclaim should not be permitted to be con-
sidered in order to determine whether the required jurisdic-
tional amount is present. Otherwise the jurisdiction of the
federal courts would be extended contrary to the express de-
sire of the Supreme Court to confine its jurisdiction and
contrary to the emphasis the Supreme Court has placed on
the plaintiff-viewpoint approach . 3
The problem of the effect of the interposition of a coun-
terclaim on the question whether the jurisdictional amount
is present, occurs more frequently when the action originates
in a state court and it is sought to remove the case to a fed-
eral court under the removal statute.94 Suppose a nonresi-
dent plaintiff sues in a state court (whether for more or less
than the jurisdictional amount) and the resident defendant
pleads a counterclaim in excess of that amount, may the
plaintiff (now ostensibly a defendant) remove the case? In
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets95 Shamrock, a Delaware
corporation, brought suit in a Texas state court against the
defendants, citizens of Texas, to recover an amount alleged
any grant of relief under the cross petition. But in that case there was no
jurisdictional basis for the counterclaim independent of the main action. In
the Moore case, the dismissal of the main bill was not for want of jurisdiction,
and the court refused to dismiss the counterclaim. Though it is suggested by
Professor Shulman that it is implicit in the case that, if a plaintiff's action is
dismissed for want of jurisdiction, the counterclaim falls, he adds that this is
so only if there is no independent jurisdictional basis for the counterclaim.
45 Yale LJ. 393, 413. Here there is such independent basis, and the rule is
that in such circumstances, when the counterclaim seeks affirmative relief, it is
sustainable without regard to what happens to the original complaint." Isenberg
v. Biddle, 125 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1941).92 
"But plainly, when jurisdiction is lacking over the primary suit, the defect
cannot be cured by a counterclaim of which the court also lacks jurisdiction."
Goldstone v. Payne, 94 F2d 855, 857 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 585
(1938). See Home Ins. Co. v. Trotter, 130 F2d 800 (8th Cir. 1942).
93 "The rule governing dismissal for want of jurisdiction in cases brought
in the federal court is that, unless the law gives a different rule, the sum claimed
by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith." St. Paul
Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938).
9428 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1450 (1952).
95 313 U.S. 100 (1941), 29 CALiF. L. Rav. 769, 27 VA. L. Rav. 1094.
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to be due on an open account for the purchase price of cer-
tain goods sold by it to the defendants.9 6 In addition to a
general denial, the defendants also filed, inter alia, in the
state court what they called a set-off and cross-action,
unrelated to the account sued upon by the plaintiff, whereby
they demanded damages totaling $7,200. Defendants prayed
that, on final hearing, the plaintiff take nothing by its suit
against them, and that they have judgment against the plain-
tiff on their cross-action.9 7  The plaintiff in the state court
then removed the cause to the United States District Court
for Northern Texas, which denied the defendant's motion to
remand. After a trial on the merits 9 the federal nisi prius
court gave judgment for the plaintiff both on the cause of
action set up on its complaint in the suit and on the counter-
claim. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed 11
and ordered the cause remanded to the state court on the
ground that the plaintiff in the state court was not a
"defendant" within the meaning of the then existing stat-
ute, 00 and, hence, was not entitled to remove the cause under
that statute, which in terms authorized the removal of a suit
subject to its provisions only "by the defendant or defendants
therein." 101 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
solve a conflict of decisions 102 and emphasized first that al-
though under state procedure judgment could go against the
plaintiff on the counterclaim in the full amount demanded
therein, this did not turn the plaintiff into a defendant; that
the removal statute, being nationwide, was intended to be
uniform in its application; and that it must be construed as
setting up ". . . its own criteria, irrespective of local law,
96 The amount demanded by the plaintiff was in excess of the federal juris-
dictional minimum.
97 Plaintiff argued "... that although nominally a plaintiff in the state court
it was in point of substance a defendant to the cause of action asserted in the
counterclaim upon which, under Texas procedure, judgment could go against
the plaintiff in the full amount demanded." Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Sheets, supra note 95 at 104.
's The order denying remand, being interlocutory, is not appealable except
on final judgment.
99 115 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1940).
10028 U.S.C. §71 (1940).
10 The same provision is found in the present statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)
(1952).
102312 U.S. 675 (1941).
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for determining in what instances suits are to be removed
from the state to the federal courts." 103 Thereupon, after
examining the removal statute and its legislative history, the
Supreme Court found it to authorize removal only by the
"defendant or defendants" in the suit.
The cases in the federal courts on which petitioner relies have
distinguished the decision in West v. Aurora City . . . [6 Wall. 139
(U.S. 1867)] on the ground that it arose under an earlier statute.
But we find no material difference upon the present issue between the
two statutes, and the reasoning of the Court in support of its deci-
sion is as applicable to one as to the other. In some of those cases
it is suggested also that a plaintiff who brings his suit in a state court
for less than the jurisdictional amount does not waive his right to
remove, upon the filing of a counterclaim against him. And petitioner
argues that this is so even when, as in the present case, the plaintiff's
demand is in excess of the jurisdictional amount. But we think the
amount of the plaintiff's demand in the state court is immaterial, for
one does not acquire an asserted right by not waiving it, and the
question here is not of waiver but of the acquisition of a right which
can only be conferred by Act of Congress. 10 4
Prior to the holding in the Shamrock case, as indicated
by the Supreme Court, there had been a sharp and irrecon-
cilable split of authority on this point.10 5  The Shamrock
case reviewed the historical development of the removal stat-
ute, pointing out that subsequent to the Judiciary Act of
1789,106 on which West v. Aurora City 107 was based, the
practice in favor of removal was extended in 1875 so as to
103313 U.S. 100, 104 (1941).
104 Id. at 108. See Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Stude, 204 F.2d 116 (8th Cir.
1953), aff'd, 346 U.S. 574 (1954) (In a condemnation proceeding the railroad,
designated as "defendant" under Iowa law, appealed to the state court from
a sheriff's commission's award and sought removal. The court held that the
railroad was not a defendant under the removal statute.); Hoyt v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 130 F.2d 636 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 687 (1942);
Lee Foods Division, Consol. Grocers Corp. v. Bucy, 105 F. Supp. 402 (W.D.
Mo. 1952); Sequoyah Feed & Supply Co. v. Robinson, 101 F. Supp. 680 (W.D.
Ark. 1951).
105 See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, supra note 103 at 103; Flory,
Federal Removal Jurisdiction, 1 LA. L. REv. 499, 737 (1939); Evans, The
Removal of Causes, 33 VA. L. Rmv. 445, 464 (1947); Note, 28 N.C. L. REv.
414 (1950).211 STAT. 73 (1789).
1076 Wall. 139 (U.S. 1867).
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permit removal by either plaintiff or defendant,"'8 but that
in 1887 the phrase "either party" was changed to "defendant
or defendants." 109
When in 1948, Title 28 was enacted and made positive
law Section 1441(a) 10° thereof, it retained the words "may
be removed by the defendant or the defendants." ill Fur-
thermore Section 1441 (b) "" makes it clear that the right of
removal to a federal court is allowable only to a nonresident
defendant, not to one being sued in his own state court so
far as actions grounded on diversity of citizenship are
concerned.
What is the situation when cases are sought to be
removed to a federal court? Under Subsection (c) of Section
1441 of Title 28, "separate and independent" removable
claims, if "joined" with otherwise non-removable claims or
causes of action, may justify the removal of the entire
case.113  Are counterclaims within the contemplation of this
provision?
Prior to the enactment in 1948 of the present Judicial
Code, removal was permitted when there was a ".... contro-
versy which is wholly between citizens of different States,
and which can be fully determined as between them .... 2) 114
It is significant that the word "controversy" is absent from
108 18 STAT. 470 (1875).
10924 STAT. 552 (1887).
11062 STAT. 937 (1948).
111"Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the de-
fendants to the district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)
(1952):
112 "(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdic-
tion founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws
of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or
residence of the parties. - Any other such action shall be removable only if none
of the parties in interest properly joined and'served as defendants is a citizen
of the State in which such action is brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1952).
113 "Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which
would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise
non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and
the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may
remand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(c) (1952). See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6
(1951), 19 A.L.R.2d 738.
11428 U.S.C. §71 (1946).
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the present section and joinder of separate and independent
claims and causes of action is substituted. Under the for-
mer section the courts were in conflict, in removed cases, as
to whether a counterclaim interposed by a defendant could
be deemed part of the "controversy" between the plaintiff
and defendant. For example, in Lee v. Continental Ins.
Co.,'n  plaintiff had instituted his action in a court of Utah
Territory claiming damages for less than the jurisdictional
minimum and the defendant had interposed a counterclaim
against the plaintiff seeking money damages in excess of that
requirement, the counterclaim being of a class which defen-
dant was required by local statute to present in the local
action on pain of being forever barred from litigating it. In
denying a motion to remand, the federal court said:
• . . my inclination is to adopt the conclusion that the amount in-
volved in a counterclaim is a part of the subject-matter in dispute,
within the meaning of the act of congress conferring jurisdiction upon
the federal court, and that inclination is strongly fortified in the case
at bar by the terms of the Utah statute .... "The matter in dispute,"
to use the phraseology of the act of congress in question, is not only
the $1,000 which the plaintiff sues for, but it is that which, of neces-
sity, under the statute in question, must be litigated in connection
with it.11 6o
Pertinent here is the last quoted phrase which, it would seem,
bases the fusion of the amount of the counterclaim with the
amount sought by the plaintiff upon the compulsory nature
of the counterclaim. The same construction has been adopted
in recent cases which followed the principle of the Lee case." 7
However, some of the earlier cases permitted removal on
the basis of a counterclaim even when the counterclaim was
not compulsory under the state practice, though permitted by
state statute. Illustrative of this line of cases is Clarkson v.
Afanso n"8 which was an action brought in a New York state
115 74 Fed. 424 (C.C.D. Utah 1896).
116 Id. at 425.
117 See Lange v. Chicago, PLI. & P.R.R, 99 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Iowa 1951);
McLean Trucking Co. v. Carolina Scenic Stages, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 437 (M.D.
N.C. 1951); Wheatley v. Martin, 62 F. Supp. 109 (W.D. Ark. 1945).
11s 4 Fed. 257 (C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1880). See Judge Hough's opinion quoted
in Yankaus v. Feltenstein, 244 U.S. 127, 131-133 (1917).
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court for less than the jurisdictional minimum (at that time
$500). The defendant counterclaimed for $750 damages aris-
ing out of the same transaction. The court denied the re-
mand motion, saying: "But there is nothing to prevent a
state court from allowing an insufficient amount in dispute
to become an adequate amount, under the act of 1875,119 or
prevent such insufficient amount from becoming an adequate
amount under that act by the operation of the statute of
New York and the lawful acts of the parties to the suit
thereunder." 120
The Clarkson case 121 was distinguished, however, in
Haney v. Wilcheck 122 on the ground that there the under-
lying theory was that the counterclaim was in effect a sep-
arate suit in which the original defendant became the plain-
tiff, and was removable under the provisions of the then
existent removal statute, which allowed either plaintiff or
defendant to remove, whereas now only a nonresident defen-
dant may remove in a diversity case. 1
23
Following the distinction made in the Lee case, 1 24 many
of the cases wherein removal was denied, involved actions
where the counterclaim was permissive and not compulsory.
However, the rationale of these cases has generally been that
only the claims of the plaintiff may be considered in deter-
mining what in fact is the "matter in dispute." 125
11918 STAT. 470 (1875).
120 Clarkson v. Manson, supra note 118 at 262. In New York, all counter-
claims are still permissive. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACr § 266. It should be kept in
mind that the petition for removal is now filed in the federal court, and not,
as heretofore, in the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1952). Other cases per-
mitting removal, though the counterclaim was not compulsory, are: Price &
Hart v. T. J. Ellis & Co., 129 Fed. 482 (C.C. E.D. Ark. 1904); Carson &
Rand Lumber Co. v. Holtzclaw, 39 Fed. 578 (C.C. E.D. Mo. 1889). See Note,
Suits Removable, 10 Fed. 692 (1882).
1214 Fed. 257 (C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1880).
122 38 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Va. 1941). Other cases cited therein as supporting
the same position are: Hansen v. Pacific Coast Asphalt Cement Co., 243 Fed.
283 (S.D. Cal. 1917); Bennett v. Devine, 45 Fed. 705 (C.C. S.D. Iowa 1891);
Falls Wire Mfg. Co. v. Broderick, 6 Fed. 654 (C.C. E.D. Mo. 1881). McKown
v. Kansas & T. Coal Co., 105 Fed. 657 (C.C. W.D. Ark. 1901), was cited as
denying removal on the ground that the counterclaim was permissive.
123 See p. 214 supra.
124 74 Fed. 424 (C.C. D. Utah 1896).
125 "It seems further to be the rule that it is the claim of the plaintiff, and
not the counterclaim of the defendant, which fixes the amount in dispute in
determining the right to.remove the cause." Enger v. Northern Finance Corp.,
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Has the Judicial Code of 1948 settled this question? In
Collins v. Faucett 12 6 plaintiffs-husband and wife--sued de-
fendant in 1949 in a Florida state court for damages of $1,000
and .52,500 respectively. Defendant filed a counterclaim in
the state court for $3,500, growing out of the same cause of
action and simultaneously filed a petition for removal to the
federal district court, asserting the counterclaim as the basis
for removal. Plaintiffs moved to remand. The opinion does
not indicate that the counterclaim was compulsory either
under state or federal law, although under federal law it
could be considered compulsory. 21 The district court, in
granting the motion, cited no cases and rested its decision
solely on the text of the removal statute and its statutory
history. It said:
It seems obvious to this court that the members of Congress, in charge
of the revision of Title 28, were fully aware of the conflict in the de-
cisions of the courts on this question and, in fact, they say so in the
Reviser's Notes to Section 1441.128 If Congress had desired to grant
to a defendant the right to remove a case from a State Court to a
Federal Court based solely upon a counterclaim it could have, and
undoubtedly would have, done so in clear unambiguous language.
The Section gives no such right to a defendant. . . .129
Such an analysis does, in a sense, achieve a cutting of the
Gordian knot. Primarily, it would seem to confirm the in-
terpretation which finds in the amendment a congressional
purpose to "narrow the federal jurisdiction on removal," 130
31 F.2d 136, 139 (D. Minn. 1929). "The question is, to say the least, a doubtful
one, and where a substantial doubt exists as to the jurisdiction of the federal
court the cause should be remanded." Crane Co. v. Guanica Centrale, 132
Fed. 713 (C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1904). See La Montagne v. T. W. Harvey Lumber
Co., 44 Fed. 645 (C.C. E.D. Wis. 1891).
126 87 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Fla. 1949), 49 Micx. L. REv. 134 (1950).
27 FE. 1L CIV. P. 13.
'
2 8 The court possibly had in mind the following Reviser's Note: "Subsec-
tion (c) permits the removal of a separate cause of action but not of a separable
controversy unless it constitutes a separate and independent claim or cause of
action within the original jurisdiction of United States District Courts. In this
respect it will somewhat decrease the volume of Federal litigation." 28 U.S.C.§ 1441 (1952).
129 Collins v. Faucett, supra note 126 at 255.
130 Cf. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 107 (1941).
"The Congress, in the revision, carried out its purpose to abridge the right of
removal." American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 10 (1951),
19 A.L.R.2d 738 (The actual holding was that a separable controversy is no
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and which has been endorsed by some writers on the sub-
ject.13 1 The removal cases which have been concerned with
Section 1441 (c) have been primarily those involving the ques-
tion whether a separate and independent claim or cause of
action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, may
be removed when it is joined with one or more otherwise non-
removable claims or causes of action, or whether a defen-
dant's cross complaint may justify removal. The courts were
not directly concerned with the monetary minimum. 3 '
The difficulty with full acceptance of the holding in
Collins v. Faucett 133 is that the court, without express analy-
sis, ignored the Lee case and other like cases, discussed supra,
which were bottomed on the compulsory nature of the coun-
terclaim. Furthermore, there are at least two cases follow-
ing the Lee line of reasoning which were decided subsequent
to the 1948 enactment of the Judicial Code which did not
consider the approach deemed determinative in Collins v.
Faucett.3 4  These are McLean Trucking Co. V. Carolina
Scenic Stages, Tnc.135 and Lange v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. 13 6
In the McLean case, the court held: "It may be conceded
in this case that the above authorities sustain the position of
the plaintiff generally and in cases where the counter-claim
is optional. Those authorities are not controlling, however,
where, as here, the cause of action is one and inseparable,
where the claim of defendant, if asserted at all, must be
longer an adequate ground for removal unless it also constitutes a separate and
independent claim or cause of action. Query: Is a counterclaim a separate
and independent claim or cause of action?).
231 See MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CODE (1949);
49 MICH. L. REV. 134 (1950).
132 See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, supra note 130; Mayflower
Industries v. Thor Corp., 184 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
903 (1951); Bentley v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 174 F.2d 788
(5th Cir. 1949) ; Sequoyah Feed & Supply Co. v. Robinson, 101 F. Supp. 680
(W.D. Ark. 1951) ; Doran v. Elgin Cooperative Credit Ass'n, 95 F. Supp. 455
(D. Neb. 1950). Contra: President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Mono-
gram Assoc., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. N.Y. 1949).
133 87 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Fla. 1949).
134 Ibid.
135 95 F. Supp. 437 (M.D. N.C. 1951).
36 99 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Iowa 1951). See also Trullinger v. Rosenblum, 125
F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Ark. 1954); Rosenblum v. Trullinger, 118 F. Supp. 394
(E.D. Ark. 1954); Wright v. Lupton, 118 F. Supp. 25 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
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asserted in the first action." 137 In the Lange case, plaintiff
in an Iowa state court sued to recover $816. The defendant
filed a counterclaim for damages of 3,300 alleged to have
been sustained in the same collision, as required by the Iowa
Rules of Civil Procedure, and filed a petition for removal to
the federal court. In denying a motion to remand, the dis-
trict court held that the requisite jurisdictional amount was
involved so as to authorize removal and that the defendant
did not voluntarily submit itself to the jurisdiction of the
state court by filing its counterclaim.
To hold as plaintiff contends that we may look only to the amount
stated in the plaintiff's complaint, would be to encourage persons with
small claims who might be subject to a claim by a nonresident for a
very considerable amount to race to the State court of Iowa, and of
states with similar procedural rules as to counterclaims, in order that
they might be first to sue and thus deprive the nonresident of his right
to resort to the United States district courts.1 38
Thus, it is still uncertain whether the holding in Collins
v. Faucett is controlling. It has, however, been persuasively
suggested that: "The simplest rule, and one which would be
in line with the plaintiff's viewpoint theory, as well as the
policy of restricting federal jurisdiction, would be a require-
ment that plaintiff's complaint show that an amount exceed-
ing 3,000 exclusive of interest and costs, be in controversy,
and no counterclaim would be considered to make up that
amount." 139
EXCLusIvE OF INTEREST AND COSTS
Sections 1331 (federal question) and 1332 (diversity of
citizenship) of Title 28 both require that the matter in con-
troversy exceed the sum or value of 3,000, exclusive of in-
terest and costs.
Ordinary interest, namely, that sum which is added for
the nonpayment of the debt when due, may not be considered
137 McLean Trucking Co. v. Carolina Scenic Stages, Inc., supra note 135 at
438.
138 Lange v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., supra note 136 at 3.
139 Note, 28 N.C. L. REv. 414, 417 (1950).
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to determine whether the jurisdictional minimum is present.
Thus, in an early case, the Supreme Court dismissed an ap-
peal in a libel action for lack of jurisdiction when the orig-
inal claim was below the minimal requirement, even though,
at the time of appeal, by reason of the addition of interest up
to the time of trial, the sum exceeded $2,000, the then
minimum. 40 Where, however, the interest was specifically
allowed by the decree, it was held that the interest must be
included with the principal in order to determine what the
sum or value in dispute was at the time the appeal was taken
and allowed.141
In these cases it should not be overlooked that the former
question of monetary minimum for purposes of appeal dif-
fered from the present minimum requirement for district
court jurisdiction.
In the case of negotiable bonds which have coupons at-
tached denominated "interest," the identity of words has not
caused, as it might have, semantic confusion. The Supreme
Court pointed out that "... when the interest evidenced by
a coupon has become due and payable the demand based upon
the promise contained in such coupon is no longer a mere
incident of the principal indebtedness represented by the
bond, but becomes really a principal obligation," 142 and the
face amount of such coupons may be added to the amount of
the bond to provide jurisdiction. 41 However, the actual in-
terest on the bonds after maturity, and on the coupons after
maturity, cannot be aggregated to the principal amount to
provide the jurisdictional requirements. 44
A similar result has been reached in insurance cases.
Thus, where an insured sought to recover the amount of
140 Udall v. The Steamship Ohio, 17 How. 17 (U.S. 1854); see Kenholz v.
Bache, 184 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1950).
141 Massachusetts Benefit Ass'n v. Miles, 137 U.S. 689 (1891); District of
Columbia v. Gannon, 130 U.S. 227 (1889); The Rio Grande, 19 Wall. 178
(U.S. 1873).142 Edwards v. Bates County, 163 U.S. 269, 272 (1896).
143 Ibid. See Tyler County v. Town, 23 F2d 371 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 278
U.S. 601 (1928); Thronateeska Pecan Co. v. Matthews, 277 Fed. 361 (5th
Cir. 1921); Glen Investment Co. v. Romero, 254 Fed. 239 (8th Cir. 1918);
Comment, 10 TULANE- L. REv. 289 (1936).
144 Kenholz v. Bache, supra note 140; City of Pawhuska v. Midland Valley




premiums paid ($1,945.80) with interest ($1,412.97) the
appellate court dismissed sua sponte, holding that in such
a case interest was merely "accessory and incidental to the
sums thus paid." 145
Even though, in a suit on a promissory note, interest not
paid when due was to be regarded as principal and itself
bear interest, it was held that such interest was accessory
and not part of the principal demand for the purpose of de-
termining the amount in controversy. 14 6  But where a
supersedeas bond was given covering both the face amount
of the judgment and interest which together aggregated the
jurisdictional amount, a suit on the bond was within the
federal jurisdictional minimum.147
Where the action sounds in tort, it is clear that the same
criterion applies: Is the interest sought "interest as such"
or is it "... the use of an interest calculation as an instru-
mentality in arriving at the amount of damages to be awarded
on the principal demand"? 148
An interesting example is Chesbrough v. Woodworth.149
There, in an action for damages for fraudulent representa-
tion as to the value of stock purchased by plaintiff at the
price of $1,450 (jurisdictional minimum then $2,000) the
court held that the jury might properly allow plaintiff
a... an annual percentage, not as collateral interest, but as
an element in giving her entire compensation for her loss.
Damages of that kind, although computed at a percentage
rate and equivalent to contract interest, would not be that
'interest' which the jurisdictional statute . says must be
excluded." 150
14 Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harwood, 16 F.2d 250, 251 (1st Cir.
1926) ; see Athan v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 73 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1934) ; Gilliland
v. Colorado Life Co., 15 F. Supp. 367 (W.D. Mo. 1936); Voorhees v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 250 Fed. 484 (D. N.J. 1918). Contra: Continental Casualty Co.
v. Spradlin, 170 Fed. 322 (4th Cir. 1909) ; Brush v. World Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 33 F.2d 1007 (S.D. Fla. 1929).
'146 Fritchen v. Mueller, 27 F.2d 167 (D. Kan. 1928).
247 Fitchner v. American Surety Co., 2 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Fla. 1933); cf.
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 65 F. Supp. 916 (W.D. Ark. 1946).148 Brown v. Webster, 156 U.S. 328, 329 (1895).
149251 Fed. 881 (6th Cir. 1918), aff'd, 252 U.S. 83 (1920).
150 Id. at 883. See York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944),
rcV'd on other grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Simecek v. United States Nat.
Bank, 91 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1937).
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By logical extension of this doctrine, when the interest
is in the nature of a "penalty" it may be considered in de-
termining the jurisdictional amount.151
ATTORNEY'S FED AS COSTS
Although Sections 1331 and 1332 of Title 28 do not spe-
cifically refer to an attorney's fee, the question has arisen at
times whether this fee is included in the word "costs," and,
therefore, not a part of "the sum or value" for purposes of
determining the jurisdictional amount.152  Taxation of costs
is provided for in Title 28, Section 1920 (taxation of costs) '- 3
and also in Section 1923 (docket fees and costs of briefs) .154
151 See Note, Interest and Costs in Determining Federal Jurisdiction, 94 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 401, 406 (1946). See, e.g., Cahill v. Hovenden, 132 F.2d 422 (10th
Cir. 1942) ; Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Ogden Levee Dist, 15 F.2d 637 (8th
Cir. 1926); American Union Ins. Co. v. Lowman Wine & B. Co., 92 F. Supp.
881 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
152 See Note, supra note 151.
153 "A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the
following:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic
transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case;(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained
for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title.
"A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in
the judgment or decree." 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1952).
154"(a) Attorney's and proctor's docket fees in courts of the United States
may be taxed as costs as follows:
$20 on trial or final hearing in civil, criminal or admiralty cases, except
that in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the libellant
recovers less than $50 the proctor's docket fee shall be $10;
$20 in admiralty appeals involving not over $1,000;
$50 in admiralty appeals involving not over $5,000;
$100 in admiralty appeals involving more than $5,000;
$5 on discontinuance of a civil action;
$5 on motion for judgment and other proceedings on recognizances;
$2.50 for each deposition admitted in evidence.
(b) The docket fees of United States attorneys shall be paid to the clerk
of court and by him paid into the Treasury.
(c) In admiralty appeals the court may allow as costs for printing the
briefs of the successful party not more than:
$25 where the amount involved is not over $1,000;
$50 where the amount involved is not over $5,000;
$75 where the amount involved is over $5,000." 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1952).
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It seems fairly obvious that such costs may not be used to
compute the requisite jurisdictional sum.155
Normally, too, an attorney's fee is itself not part of the
"cause of action" or "claim," 156 so as to be added to the prin-
cipal sum. But exception has been made in certain types of
actions. Thus, in what is a leading case in this field,
Springstead v. Crawfordsville State Bank,15 the Supreme
Court held that, where a promissory note provided for pay-
ment of a reasonable attorney's fee if suit was brought, such
fee was not costs, but includible to determine the jurisdic-
tional amount. The Court said:
It may be that the agreement to pay an attorney's fee in the event
of suit created only an accessory right (though under Brown v.
Webster, 156 U.S. 328, this is doubtful), but nevertheless it gave a
right to recover and created a legal obligation to pay. It is true its
effectiveness was dependent upon suit being brought, yet the moment
suit was brought the liability to pay the fee became a "matter in
controversy" and as such to be computed in making up the requisite
jurisdictional amount .... 158
Such an obligation to pay an attorney's fee, it would seem,
is contractual in its nature.
What is the answer, however, where the obligation is
statutory, i.e, where a state statute provides that in certain
types of cases, attorney's fees are taxable as costs in the state
court? Since, by statute, an attorney's fee is only allowable
upon entry of judgment, some of the early cases held that
such a fee could not be included to make up the requisite
jurisdictional amount. 59
In People of Sioux County v. i'Ttional Surety Co.160 the
Supreme Court clarified the problem by pointing out that
155 Cogswell v. Tribune Co., 16 F. Supp. 631 (S.D. N.Y. 1936); Baker v.
Howell, 44 Fed. 113 (C.C. D. Nev. 1890).
156 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8, describing a claim for relief.
'57231 U.S. 541 (1913).
25 8 Id. at 542. See Nathan v. Rock Springs Distilling Co., 10 F2d 268 (6th
Cir. 1926); Alropa Corp. v. Myers, 55 F. Supp. 936 (D. Del. 1944); Sonnesyn
v. Federal Cartridge Co., 54 F. Supp. 29 (D. Minn. 1944) ; LeRoy v. Hartwick,
229 Fed. 857 (E.D. Ark. 1916).
159 Peters v. Queen Ins. Co., 182 Fed. 113 (C.C. S.D. Ga. 1910); Swafford
v. Cornucopia Mines, 140 Fed. 957 (C.C. D. Ore. 1905).
160 276 U.S. 238 (1928).
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although a state statute of this type may denominate such
additional allowance for an attorney's fee as "costs" to be
included in the judgment, such an allowance is not "costs"
in the traditional sense. The Court said:
The present allowance, since it is not costs in the ordinary sense, is
not within the field of costs legislation covered by R.S. §§ 823, 824.
That the particular mode of enforcing the right provided by the state
statute-i.e., by taxing the allowance as costs-is not available to the
federal courts under R.S. §§ 823, 824 does not preclude the recovery.
Since the right exists the federal courts may follow their own appro-
priate procedure for its enforcement by including the amount of the
fee in the judgment.' 6 '
The rationale appears to be that where the state policy makes
the inclusion of such fees mandatory in the state court judg-
ment for costs, removal should not thwart the policy.' 6 2
The problem was even more explicitly presented by the
Supreme Court in Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Jones. 1 3
As stated by the Court: "In a removal proceeding based
upon diversity of citizenship, is it proper to treat attor-
neys' fees imposed by the Arkansas statute and claimed
by the plaintiff, as part of the sum necessary for jurisdiction
in the federal court?" 14 The Court, citing the Sioux County
case, 1 65 answered its question in the affirmative, saying: "In
the state court the present respondent sought to enforce the
liability imposed by statute for his benefit-to collect some-
thing to which the law gave him a right. The amount so de-
manded became part of the matter put in controversy by the
complaint, and not mere 'costs' excluded from the reckoning
by the jurisdictional and removal statutes." 166
161 Id. at 244.
162 Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Cortez Cigar Co., 92 F.2d 882 (5th Cir.
1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 636 (1938); New York Underwriters' Fire Ins.
Co. v. Malham & Co., 25 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1928); Orlando Candy Co. v.
New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 51 F.2d 392 (S.D. Fla. 1931); Kellems v.
California CIO Council, 6 F.R.D. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1946); see Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Carlson, 126 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1942).
163290 U.S. 199 (1933), 12 TEXAS L. REv. 363 (1934).
164 Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, sapra note 163 at 200.
165 People of Sioux County v. National Surety Co., 276 U.S. 238 (1928).
166 Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, supra note 163 at 202. See Sonnesyn
v. Federal Cartridge Co., 54 F. Supp. 29 (D. Minn. 1944); Merrigan v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 43 F. Supp. 209 (E.D. La. 1942); Ray v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 20 F. Supp. 497 (W.D. La. 1937).
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While the attorney's fee may be included to determine
the amount in controversy, it should be noted that there is a
limit of reasonableness on the amount of the fee which may
be included. Thus, where an action was brought by an in-
sured on an insurance policy for unpaid disability benefits
amounting to no more than $1,300, which sum, when added
to $500 hospital expenses and 12 per cent statutory penalty,
totalled only $2,016, necessitating a sum in excess of $984
as an attorney's fee to make up the requisite jurisdictional
amount, the court held that the claimed attorney's fee was so
unreasonable as to preclude federal jurisdiction.1 7
The purpose of this rather extensive discussion has been
to point up some of the problems which are present in various
cases when the monetary minimum is a prerequisite to fed-
eral jurisdiction. As indicated, a number of these problems
have not been conclusively resolved. It is hoped that this
paper may be of some help to their solution.
167 Colorado Life Co. v. Steele, 95 F.2d 535 (8th Cir. 1938) ; see New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Greenfield, 154 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1946) (The disability claim
was only for $1,250 so that the attorney's fee would have had to be over
$1,750.).
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